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Cohen v. California: "Inconsequential" Cases and

Larger Principles
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.*
The editors of this law review have vexed me with the task of

identifying my "favorite" case. At the outset, it seems worthwhile to
identify what this task does not entail. It does not require identifying a
"most important" or "most significant" case.' Nor does it oblige me to
identify a "most infamous" or "most dubious" case.2 Instead, I am to
identify a case for which I have a particular fondness-a task that involves

more than a little bit of caprice.'
Although I am partial to many cases, I must confess a particular

affection for Cohen v. California,4 commonly known in law schools as the
"fuck the draft" case. I like the case because it speaks eloquently to values
that transcend its facts, and does so in a way that vindicates core civil

liberties-liberties that are plainly essential to maintaining our democracy. 5
Cohen also serves as an exemplar on the importance of careful judging.
Judges-even good judges-sometimes allow the seemingly

insignificant facts of a particular case, or their emotional response to those
facts, to distract them from the larger legal issues that a case presents.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University. B.A., M.A. 1987, Emory University; J.D.,
LL.M. 1991, Duke University.
1. There are a number of good candidates for this distinction. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Again, a number of cases immediately come to mind. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393 (1856); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
3. As Justice Scalia wryly noted in Pope v. Illinois: "De gustibus non est disputandum," which
means, roughly, "In matters of taste, there is no disputing." 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Scalia, I.,
concurring).
4. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
5. See ALEXANDERMEIKLEIOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT26-27
(1948) ("The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of selfgovernment. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic
American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage."); AlexanderMeiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245 (arguing that the First Amendment
"protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern.'"); CAss
R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 18-23 (1990) (arguing that the First
Amendment's system of free expression serves as the foundation of a process that secures and maintains
the central constitutional goal of creating a deliberative democracy).

1251

1252

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 74:1251

Indeed, Justice Harlan recognized this phenomenon in the opening lines of
his majority opinion in Cohen: "This case may seem at first blush too
inconsequential to find its way into our books, but the issue it presents is
of no small constitutional significance."6
In fact, Cohen involves nothing less than the scope of the First
Amendment's protection of core political speech and the ability of the
government to prohibit disfavored means of political expression. That
Justice Harlan recognized this gives strong testament to his ability to see
the forest in a tree.
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. Mr. Cohen wore
a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft" while standing in a
corridor of the Los Angeles County Courthouse. Although no violence or
disturbance ensued, the State of California charged Cohen with
"maliciously and willfully" disturbing the peace. Following his conviction
on this charge, Cohen was sentenced to thirty days imprisonment.7
In an opinion that turns only square corners, Justice Harlan reversed
the conviction on First Amendment grounds. He began his analysis by
describing what the case was not about: it was not about maintaining
decorum in the courtrooms of California, it was not about obscenity or
fighting words, and it was not about foisting vulgarities on an unwilling
audience.8 "Against this background, the issue flushed out by this case
stands out in bold relief."9
For Justice Harlan, the issue was a simple one: "[W]e deal here with
a conviction resting solely upon 'speech,' not upon any separately
identifiable conduct .. 1.0.oCalifornia had attempted to "excise, as
offensive conduct, one particular scurrilous epithet"" from the marketplace of ideas; the Court's task, therefore, was to determine whether the
government may "properly remove this 'offensive word' from the public
vocabulary."12 For Justice Harlan, the answer to this question was a
resounding "no."
Justice Harlan takes the juvenile antics of a scruffy antiwar demonstrator and, performing constitutional alchemy, places them at the very
core of our project of democratic self-government:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced

6. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15.
7. Id. at 16-17.
8. Id. at 18-22.
9. Id.at22.
10. Id. at 18 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
11. Id.at 22.
12. Id. at 23.
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largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more
perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.13
Justice Harlan was able to separate the larger legal principle from the
particular facts before the Court.
Harlan's opinion, much like the famous Holmes and Brandeis opinions
in Abrams v. United States,' Gitlow v. New York,15 and Whitney v.
California,6 is a celebration of the values implicit in the First
Amendment.' 7 "To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom [of
expression] may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even
offensive utterance."' However, "[tihese are.., in truth necessary side
effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate
permits us to achieve."19 Accordingly, "[tihat the air may at times seem
filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness, but
of strength."' This rhetoric reflects the very best of the "marketplace of
ideas" paradigm first espoused by Justice Holmes in Abrams.2'
Justice Harlan offers a stern warning to those who, like the dissenters,
would dismiss the case based on its sophomoric facts: "We cannot lose
sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying
instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental
societal values are truly implicated."'
At bottom, Justice Harlan
recognized that the state cannot ban the use of particular words without
"running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."'
One
need look no further than George Orwell's anti-utopian masterpiece 1984
to find strong support for this kind of concern. Ultimately, the ability to
define language becomes the ability to control thoughts. Justice Harlan

13. Id. at 24.
14. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, I., dissenting).
15. 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
16. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, I., concurring).
17. See WILiAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDmENT 34-35, 107
n.38 (1984) (citing Cohen, Abrams, Gitlow, and Whimey for the idea that extreme and offensive speech
is valuablebecause of its ability to grab attention and force debate on difficult issues); see also William
W. Van Alstyne, The Enduring Example of John Marshall Harlan: Virtue as Practice in the Supreme
Court, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 109, 119-20 (1991) ("The appreciation of First Amendment core
principles is represented as straight forwardly in Harlan's opinion in Cohen as in the best opinions
decades earlier by Holmes and Brandeis.").
18. Cohenv. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971).
19. Id. at 25.
20. Id.
21. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, I., dissenting); see also
SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 24-26 (describing and analyzing Holmes's marketplace metaphor).
22. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
23. Id. at 26.
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recognized this fact, and interposed the First Amendment as an impediment

to any such project.
The first time I read Cohen, I was impressed that Justice Harlan could

recognize and relate Cohen's "absurd and immature antic"' to the public
debate that is essential to maintaining a healthy democracy.

By distin-

guishing the question of full and free public debate from the particular
content of the message (or the nature of the messenger), Justice Harlan
vindicated the individual citizen's right to hold and share political views
within the marketplace of ideas, and to communicate those ideas in
unconventional-or even patently offensive-ways.'
All the more
remarkably, he did so without lionizing or embracing Mr. Cohen's specific

behavior.
Justice Harlan plainly recognized that the relative insignificance (or
low value) of the particular political expression at issue did not affect the
importance of the larger First Amendment principles that Cohen's message
implicated. Jurists sometimes take too lightly the doctrinal importance of
"inconsequential" cases.' The result is bad law.s

24. This is how three dissenting Justices, in their two paragraph opinion, describe the case. Id.
at 27 (Blackmun, I., dissenting). For the dissenters, the phrase "fuck the draft" fell outside the First
Amendment because it either constituted conduct rather than speech or fell within the "fighting words"
doctrine (which Justice Blackmun does not bother to explicate, apparently deeming the matter selfevident). Id. (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). There was probably a good dissent to be written in Cohen;
in some respects, it is a shame that the dissenters deemed the case too picayune to warrant more
consideration than two paragraphs.
25. As Justice Harlan put it, "[O]ne man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Id. at 25. Antiabortion
protestors provide a modem day analog to Mr. Cohen's behavior. Plainly, displaying photographs of
aborted fetuses to unsuspecting passersby while screaming "murderer" is not the kind of behavior that
Judith Martin would sanction. Cf.JUDITH MARTIN, MISS MANNERS' GUIDE FOR THE TURN-OF-THEMILLENNIUM (1990). Whether we extol or excoriate this kind of social protest, the First Amendment,
as interpreted in Cohen, gives protesters broad latitude to select the means of communicatingtheir point
of view. Whether the means selected are persuasive, or even minimally effective, is entirely beside
the point, at least insofar as the First Amendment is concerned. "[Tihe State has no right to cleanse
public debate to the point where it is grammatically [or graphically] palatable to the most squeamish
among us.' Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
26. In this respect, there is a strong degree of consanguinity between Cohen and Justice Brennan's
opinions in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990). These opinions do an excellentjob of vindicating important First Amendmentvalues without
endorsing the particular behavior at issue (flag burning). See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 419 ("The way to
preserve the flag's special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to
persuade them that they are wrong."); Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318-19 ("We are aware that desecration
of the flag is deeply offensive to many.... [But p]unishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very
freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering.").
27. Compare Justice Harlan's approach in Cohen with Justice Powell's offhanded abandonment
of his decisivevote in Bowers v. Hardwick,which he derisively described as a "frivolous" case. JOHN
C. JE FRIES, JUSTICE LEWIs F. POWELL, JR. 530, 513-30 (1994); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 197-98, 198 n.2 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (holding that there is "no fundamental right
... such as that claimed by respondent Hardwick," to engage in consensual sodomy, and arguing that
this should not be a cause for concern because "the history of nonenforcement suggests the moribund
character today of laws criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct").
28. At the risk of being overbold, I believe that the verdict of history will not be kind to Bowers.
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Judges must be able to look beyond the importance of the particular
case before them to the broader implications of their ruling. For example,
at one level, Marbury v. Madison29 is a case about whether Marbury

would become the functional equivalent of a notary public in Washington,
D.C."

Obviously, the legal principles involved in Marbury transcended

the particular facts before the court, a point not lost on Chief Justice
Marshall. A seemingly "inconsequential" case implicated nothing less than

the proper institutional role of the Supreme Court in explicating the law.
Cohen provides an excellent example of this phenomenon, for even Justice
Harlan himself initially described the case as a "peewee."'"

Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen is also remarkable for its ability to
get beyond the strong emotional pull of the facts before the Court. All too

often, judges permit their emotional response to the facts of a case to
control their legal analysis32 --an intellectual trap that caught the four
dissenting justices in Cohen.3 Justice Harlan admirably resisted this
temptation, hewing carefully to the larger First Amendment implications

of permitting the state to criminalize the use of the word "fuck" in a
political statement about the Vietnam War.
Finally, I am fond of Cohen because of its simplicity. The facts are
straightforward; the issue is squarely presented. This factual and doctrinal

clarity contributes not only to the opinion's persuasive force, but also helps
to educate the citizenry about the importance of open debate in a demo-

cratic society. In language easily understood by most citizens, Justice
Harlan explains-over the course of fewer than a dozen pages-why the
First Amendment precludes the state from prohibiting a particular form of
political expression. In this respect, the opinion is akin to a medieval
morality play in which Everyman meets Free Expression. Too many of the

29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
30. See William W. Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1,
3-6.
31. BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 128
(1979). The Brethren provides an amusing history of the inside court politics associated with Cohen.
See id. at 128-33.
32. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421-30 (1990) (Rehnquist, I., dissenting)
(resorting to poetry and patriotic sloganeering in a pathetic attempt to justify a purely emotional
response to the facts of the case). See generally Calvin R. Massey, The Jurisprudenceof Poetic
License, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1052, 1047-52 (condemning the Rehnquist dissent as "emotion laden
poetic fantasy"). Justice Stevens's vote in Johnson also bears all the indicia of the heart overbearing
the head. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even if flag burning could be
considered just another species of symbolic speech under the logical application of the rules that the
Court has developed in its interpretation of the First Amendment in other contexts, this case has an
intangible dimension that makes those rules inapplicable."); see also United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310, 319-24 (1991) (Stevens, ., dissenting).
33. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27, 27-28 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (calling
Cohen's behavior "absurd and immature").
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Supreme Court's free expression cases-rife with three-part tests and
various kinds of balancing contortions-obfuscate the basic political values
embodied in the First Amendment.
In sum, Cohen v. California is one of my favorite cases because it
vindicates an important aspect of individual freedom and demonstrates the
importance of careful judging. Along the way, it provides a good lesson
about the potential doctrinal importance of seemingly "insignificant" cases.
It is an opinion worth celebrating, reflecting the best intellectual traditions
of the federal bench.

